Iron Crowned Chapter 5

â€Å"Damn it,† I muttered to Dorian. He simply squeezed my hand tighter, his smile growing bigger. I wasn't afraid of Ysabel, not at all. I didn't think for an instant she could hook Dorian back in, and magic-wise, she was no match for me. She'd actually helped teach me control of air and wind – her specialty – and I'd quickly surpassed her. Nonetheless, she was sharp-tongued; I was certain dinner with her would be an onslaught of snide and passive-aggressive remarks. Rurik's blunt nature made him good at throwing out barbs of his own, so I was hoping he might assist me. Once we sat down, though, I soon learned Ysabel wasn't the only one I had to worry about. Other nobles of no consequence were there, but a new face took precedence. Her name was Edria – and she was Ysabel's mother. She had an attractive, matronly look about her, though her hair and eyes were dark. Ysabel was blue-eyed with rich auburn hair that made her stunning. Ysabel's body went a long way to contribute to her allure as well. What the two women definitely had in common was a crafty, sly demeanor that told me both had few scruples when it came to furthering their own interests. And it was clear that my being with Dorian was not in their interests. In public, gentry etiquette dominated, and Edria was the picture of politeness. â€Å"Your Majesty, it is an honor.† â€Å"Thank you,† I said, settling next to Dorian on a very cozy and ornate love seat. It squeezed us together, something I knew he didn't mind as his eyes continued to rake over my body. Our legs were so near each other's that I made the concession of letting mine drape slightly over his. Our seat was pulled up close to the table, so the long, heavy tablecloth hid this boldness on my part – as well as the hand he rested on my thigh. â€Å"I'm surprised to see you here, Your Majesty,† said Ysabel demurely. With the way her breasts practically spilled out of her dress, I wondered how I could have felt self-conscious about my tight bodice. â€Å"I thought you were busy managing your land and your †¦ human matters.† â€Å"It's not surprising at all,† remarked Rurik, just before reaching for a giant drumstick. He took a huge, savage bite, but waited until he swallowed before continuing with the next remark. It was an improvement on past manners. â€Å"She and my lord can hardly stay away from each other.† I smiled at the use of â€Å"my lord.† Even after Dorian had sent Rurik to serve me, the soldier still thought of Dorian as his master. â€Å"Of course,† said Edria, rushing in when Ysabel's expression turned frosty. â€Å"It's just, from what we've heard, you aren't interested in these types of functions. Indeed, I hadn't expected to meet you in such †¦ lovely attire.† â€Å"Very lovely,† said Dorian. He'd dragged his eyes from me at last and gestured for a refill on his wine. I didn't necessarily like having my appearance discussed – even if the discussion was positive – but praising me gave me a boost in status. â€Å"I'm surprised you were surprised,† said Rurik, this time speaking with his mouth full. Well, we could only expect so much progress. â€Å"Everyone's heard how beautiful my lady is. Men far and wide want her, but of course, she would only accept the best for her consort. As would my lord.† From Rurik, this was almost charming, but not to the mother and daughter duo. â€Å"My understanding,† said Edria delicately, â€Å"is that more than your, eh, looks add to your appeal. You and your lady sister are both valued for your future children. I can already see she has a number of suitors.† I glanced across the room at Jasmine, sitting by Shaya. Jasmine had a genuine smile on her face, but whether it was from being out and about or because of the men who had gathered and seemed to be paying her compliments, I couldn't say. I forced away a frown. â€Å"My sister and I have no intention of having children,† I said, turning back to my companions. â€Å"How unfortunate,† said Edria. Her eyes darted ever so slightly toward Dorian. â€Å"How unfortunate for everyone.† â€Å"Your Majesty,† said Ysabel, â€Å"have you met my children?† I flinched in surprise. I'd forgotten she had kids. Mother and daughter might insinuate that the prophecy was half of my attractiveness, but I knew that Ysabel, after losing her husband, had come to Dorian's court seeking a powerful man through the use of both her beauty and her fertility. I followed her gaze toward a small table by the fireplace. Most of its occupants were young. It was like a kids' table at Thanksgiving. I hadn't seen many gentry children and could make a good guess at Ysabel's progeny based on their red hair. She confirmed as much. â€Å"That's my daughter, Ansonia.† In human years, I would have pegged Ansonia to be about ten or eleven. Her brilliant hair was piled in braids on her head, and she was giggling at a puppy that kept nudging her feet, undoubtedly seeking handouts. â€Å"Beside her is my son, Pagiel.† He was a serious-looking young man, contrasting sharply with his laughing sister. Relatively speaking, he looked a little older than Jasmine. His red hair was darker than Ansonia's, more like Ysabel's, and his blue-gray eyes regarded the puppy's antics critically, as though deciding if he approved. At last, a tiny smile appeared on his face, transforming him and making a couple of nearby girls his age sigh adoringly. Ysabel had clearly pointed her children out as a slam against me, yet I caught sincere affection in her eyes as she regarded the two. I'd always thought her coming to court to push herself off on some guy was bordering on prostitution, but there was more to the story. Her husband had died, leaving her family in financial trouble. It made her actions more understandable, though I still thought she was a bitch. â€Å"Children are such a joy,† said Edria, looking at Dorian again. I looked at him too as he gazed at Ansonia and Pagiel. Long study had taught me that his eyes held the secrets to his true feelings whenever he wore that lazy, mysterious expression of his. And now, hidden in those green depths, I could see the glint of admiration and longing. A strange feeling welled up in my stomach, and for the first time, I could honestly believe Dorian wanted kids with me just for the sake of parenthood and no other agenda. I felt unexpected guilt over this. As though reading my thoughts, he turned his attention on me. His smile warmed me, and whatever wistfulness his eyes had betrayed was replaced now with love – love quickly mingling with lust as he took in my appearance again. In fact, his desire seemed even stronger than it had been when I first entered, and I suddenly wondered if he'd make a serious attempt at exhibitionism after all. But no, with a deep breath that seemed to summon his control, he respectfully looked back at his guests. Yet, under the table, I felt the hand on my thigh tighten, his fingers sliding over the smooth silk of the dress. Chills ran over my flesh, but I also politely kept my attention on the others. â€Å"It was amazing how easily Ysabel conceived her children,† Edria continued. â€Å"If poor Mareth had lived, I have no doubt they'd have a dozen by now.† I considered pointing out that if Ysabel was so fertile, then she would have surely gotten pregnant when she and Dorian were lovers. It seemed in bad taste to me, so I said nothing. Such topics weren't out of line for gentry, however, and Rurik again jumped in to defend my honor and point out exactly what I'd been thinking. â€Å"But you've been with others since then,† he said. â€Å"And you haven't had any more children.† Dorian's hand began skillfully gathering the fabric of my dress's skirt so that it rose up my leg, soon bunching up and exposing my thigh altogether so that his fingers now touched bare skin. I had a feeling he wasn't paying much attention to the conversation anymore, despite a very convincing look of interest as he kept his eyes on everyone except me. Ysabel glared at Rurik. â€Å"I haven't had that many lovers.† Promiscuity wasn't an insult among gentry, but in this case, playing down her sex life was intended to explain why she had no other children. Meanwhile, Dorian's hand had moved to my inner thigh, slowly and carefully moving up so that he betrayed nothing to the others. When he reached my underwear, his fingers stopped, as though pondering this obstacle. I'd picked something thin and lacy, mostly to be alluring for later bedroom activities, but it apparently proved convenient now. He gripped the edges, braced a moment, and then jerked so hard that the fabric ripped. In the noisy room, no one heard, and I just barely swallowed a gasp. I gave him a small glare that he either ignored or didn't see. I suspected the former. â€Å"Sometimes the gods simply wait for the right opportunity – or rather, the right man.† Edria's eyes darted to Dorian who smiled at her winningly. His chin rested in the hand not under the table, his elbow propped up. â€Å"Clearly, Mareth was the right union then, and I'm sure the gods will smile approvingly on Ysabel's next husband.† Her tone and look left no question about who that would be. Rurik snorted in disgust. â€Å"I believe the gods have their hands in our affairs, but they're not interested in every detail – certainly not what goes on between the sheets.† Or under the table, apparently. Dorian's fingers, now with free access, slid all the way up between my legs. Whatever disapproval I wanted to convey was contradicted by how wet he found me. The inane smile he was giving Edria changed to something a bit more smug. With well-practiced skill, one of his fingers began stroking me, immediately finding the spot that ignited me and burned with pleasure. My heart rate sped up, both from arousal and from anxiety that someone would notice. Then, as though wanting to flaunt his audacity, he actually managed perfect conversation while still working to get me off. â€Å"Well, if Ysabel wants a new husband, we can certainly arrange that. I have a number of nobles who'd be happy to take her as a wife – or even a consort if she didn't wish to be tied down yet.† The teasing fingers between my legs had now set the rest of my body on fire. I felt my nipples hardening and regretted the thin silk of the dress. Fortunately, no one seemed to be paying attention to me, though that might change, seeing how quickly I was building to orgasm. Dorian's suggestion wasn't what Edria had wanted to hear, and the grateful expression she put on was clearly forced. â€Å"You're too kind, Your Majesty. But it would be so wasteful to give such a fertile woman to some minor lord. Surely a gift like Ysabel's deserves †¦ royalty.† The aching, tingling ecstasy created by his touch was ready to explode. And to my chagrin, I wanted it to. It was a need I had to have fulfilled. Completed. So, it was a shock when his finger moved down from my clit, sliding into me instead. It created a different kind of pleasure, but the move was frustrating, considering how close I'd been. I spread my legs slightly, giving permission for him to return, but he continued thrusting his finger into me. His motions grew harder and faster, but only the slightest movement of his body gave any sign of what he was doing, and no one seemed to pick up on it. There was something thrilling, something dangerously erotic about knowing he was doing this to me with so many potential witnesses. â€Å"You're right,† Dorian said, face turning serious, as though he was truly considering Edria's words. â€Å"And I know a couple of kings who might be interested. Rurik, do you remember †¦ does the Lotus King have a consort?† â€Å"I'm not sure,† said Rurik, clearly enjoying Dorian's game. â€Å"He's the one who has the gray streak down the middle of his beard, right? And the slightly pointed ears?† â€Å"That's the one,† replied Dorian. And then, without warning, Dorian's finger – so, so wet now – slid out and returned to my clit with such fierce rubbing that I came almost instantly. I'd been ready and aching, and that touch was all it took to push me over. My body twitched as waves of bliss radiated through me, and Dorian continued to stroke me, long after it was needed. At last, he pulled away and even went so far as to neatly pull my skirt back before returning his hand to his own lap. A very pleased smile tugged at his lips, though his attention was all on Ysabel. â€Å"Would you like me to make an introduction?† Her expression was cold, her response stiff. â€Å"You're too kind, Your Majesty. I'd hate to inconvenience you.† I hadn't paid much attention to her but realized now that she'd been paying attention to me. I was pretty sure she was the only one at the table who realized what had happened – and she wasn't happy about it. â€Å"No inconvenience at all,† he said. â€Å"I'll see what I can arrange.† Edria went out of her way to move conversation away from her daughter being hooked up with someone who wasn't Dorian. I barely heard any of it, and when dinner finally ended, I returned with Dorian to his room. My post-orgasm languor gave way to anger almost the moment he shut the door behind us. â€Å"What the hell do you think you were doing?† I exclaimed. â€Å"You had no right to do that!† Dorian made a scoffing noise as he carefully removed and folded his heavy cloak. â€Å"You didn't seem to mind. Besides, you're lucky that's all I did, what with you showing up without warning in that dress.† â€Å"Hey, I don't have to consult you on my fashion choices.† â€Å"No, but you should expect consequences.† He moved swiftly toward me, hands moving to my waist. â€Å"It was only out of respect for your silly human prudishness that I didn't just take you openly. Really, you should be grateful.† â€Å"Grateful?† I exclaimed. I sounded outraged, but in truth, the closeness of his body was arousing me again. Jesus. It was like I was always in heat. â€Å"Grateful,† he said, a glint of fierceness in his eyes. â€Å"Especially after the favor I did you. A favor you now need to repay.† The hold on my waist went tight, and he pushed me down onto the bed. I could easily have resisted – we both knew who'd win in a hand-to-hand fight – but I was more than willing to play this game, particularly when he swiftly pulled off his pants and showed the long, hard erection that had undoubtedly been ready to burst the moment he saw me in the dress. I was still wet from earlier and desperately wanted to feel him in me, thrusting as hard as he had with his finger. But to my surprise, it wasn't my legs he went for. Instead he came forward and knelt, one leg on each side of my head, and pushed himself between my lips. I made a sound of surprise at this, a sound muffled as he filled my mouth and began sliding in and out. He was so big, I could barely contain him. He knew and seemed to exalt in it, his eyes holding mine as he forced my mouth to pleasure him. â€Å"You can take it,† he said, pumping steadily. â€Å"You will take it. I told you: you owe me.† It was rough and fierce, but we both knew I didn't mind when Dorian played dominant. Besides, this change in our sex life was kind of a turn-on. Gentry, while not opposed to oral sex, almost always preferred intercourse because of their obsession with children. Somehow, the thought of him exploding in my mouth, on my lips, drove me wild. I could feel him swelling, see the lines of tension as his climax grew closer. His lips parted slightly, a small moan escaping. Then, just as I was certain he would come, he pulled out and shifted his body down and deftly pulled off my dress. With a tight grip on my legs, he pushed my thighs apart and thrust into me with a hardness that made me cry out and arch my body. It was only a few seconds, hard and fast, and then he came, his whole body spasming as he released himself into me, proving he still had the usual gentry urges. When he was finally spent, he collapsed beside me, sweating and panting. I found his hand, my own body exhausted for different reasons than his. I rolled against him, kissing his neck and tasting the salt of his skin. â€Å"I thought for sure you'd come in my mouth,† I murmured, letting my finger toy with his nipple. â€Å"Wasteful,† he murmured, running a hand over my hair. â€Å"Is it?† I pushed myself up, looking down into his eyes. I kept my voice low and dangerous. â€Å"Are you saying you wouldn't like that? Letting yourself come in my mouth, filling it up, forcing me to taste you †¦ swallow you? Or maybe you want to come on me? Spread yourself all over me?† There was a slight widening of his eyes, a rekindling of his desire. He gave me an enigmatic smile. â€Å"Maybe. Maybe next time.† I gave him a playful push. â€Å"Tease.† He yawned and took off his shirt. â€Å"It'll give you something to wonder about and look forward to, something more cheerful than the battle's outcome.† â€Å"What battle?† I asked. I'd been feeling tired too, but his words jolted me to alertness. â€Å"Tomorrow,† he said. He shifted me off of him so that he could pull the covers over us and then took me back into his arms. â€Å"I received word earlier about some Rowan movement tonight. I've sent an army to meet them, and I'll join them myself in the morning. It's near my villages at the river's bend. I think Katrice hoped to take them by surprise, but a spy tipped me off.† â€Å"Which army did you send?† We had them divided into units. â€Å"The first and third.† â€Å"Both?† I exclaimed. â€Å"That's huge.† He shrugged. â€Å"So is hers. We have to answer in kind. Besides, those villages are crucial. They supply a lot of food – to both of us.† I repressed a shiver. Those villages were full of civilians as well. Dorian's civilians, farmers and fishermen who could have been looted and killed if he hadn't gotten the warning. He and I were allies, but again, I couldn't shake the guilt of my own people being in danger over this dispute – let alone his. â€Å"I should go too,† I murmured. â€Å"I should help.† Dorian stroked my hair. â€Å"No need to put us both at risk. Besides, don't you have more mundane human tasks?† Yes, I'd promised Lara more jobs tomorrow. â€Å"They're not as important – not like this.† â€Å"Only one of us is needed,† he said firmly. â€Å"Honestly, probably not even that. We have good leaders, but the fact that one of us always shows up boosts our armies' confidence – and demoralizes hers. She won't set one dainty foot near the battlefield. So stop fretting. We'll take them. We have greater numbers.† He kissed the top of my head and took my silence as acquiescence. Soon, I felt him sleep, with that ease so many men possessed after sex. Not me. I was a longtime insomniac, and this was the kind of thing that could keep me up all night. I was tired of the armies endangering themselves. I was tired of Dorian endangering himself. I wanted the killing to stop. Kiyo had acted like it was so easy. If only that were true. After a while, I gave up on sleep altogether. I slid out of Dorian's arms and got up from the bed. Knowing my party would stay overnight, I'd packed casual clothes but nothing more. Searching through his wardrobe – twice the size of mine – I found a thick green satin robe. It was way too big but served fine as a cover-up. I left the room, needing to walk off my thoughts. The castle halls were silent now, all the revelers having gone to bed. I walked barefoot along the stone floor, trying not to trip over the too-long hem. A few stationed guards nodded as I passed, murmuring, â€Å"Your Majesty.† I'd long ago learned that while some of my human behaviors would always baffle the gentry, most of a monarch's actions – no matter how bizarre – weren't questioned. No one thought much of me wandering around in Dorian's robe. I reached a set of glass doors that led out to one of Dorian's exquisite courtyards. I knew it'd be chilly there, but sitting outside suddenly seemed like a good idea. Another guard stood there watchfully and opened the door at my approach. I knew this courtyard and knew where a gorgeously colored mosaic-tiled table stood in the corner. It was dull in the night, but as I sat in a chair, the spot gave me a good view of the garden and the thick stars above. Flickering torches set on poles were scattered around, just enough for guidance but not enough to ruin the night's charm. The beauty and peacefulness soothed me a little but couldn't shake away my worries about the war. I'd spent so much of my life fighting that I'd thought I was immune to blood and killing. I now knew there was a very big difference between an individual kill and death en masse. One – usually – had a point. An individual kill punished the guilty party. Armies dead on the battlefield punished no one except the innocent. â€Å"My lady Thorn Queen?† I jumped at the hissing voice that spoke to me from the darkness. At first I saw nothing and wondered if I had a ghost on hand. Then, a dark shape materialized from between some trees. It came closer, revealing a wizened gentry woman. She was small, shorter than Jasmine, but her white hair was thick and lustrous, her clothing rich. She came to a halt before me. â€Å"Who-who are you?† I asked. My words came out harsh, mostly because of my surprise. She took no offense. Again, a queen's behaviors weren't questioned. â€Å"My name is Masthera.† I shivered, not from the night's chill. There was something unsettling about her. â€Å"What are you doing out here?† â€Å"I've come to speak with you, Your Majesty. You're worried about the war. You want to end it.† â€Å"How do you know that?† She spread her hands out. â€Å"I am a seeress. I sense things that are, sometimes things to come. I also offer advice.† This chased a little of my fear away. â€Å"Seeress† was a fancy way of saying â€Å"psychic,† as far as I was concerned. When you dealt with the supernatural as often as I did, you ran into a lot of so-called psychics. Most were frauds, and I suspected that was as true among gentry as humans. â€Å"Have you come to offer me advice?† I asked wryly. Masthera nodded, face grave. â€Å"Yes, Your Majesty. I've come to tell you how to end your war – without any more bloodshed.†

Congress of the United States Essay

The chronology of events during the revolution era are: Black Loyalists, A century of Law making for a new constitution, The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources-1745-1799, Letters of Delegates to Congress- 1774-1789, The Rochambeau Map Collection, American Revolutionary War – (dead link). The date for the Declaration of Independence is July 4, 1776, and the US constitution is September 17, 1778. Authority granted to the following government branches; Congress- article 1 states that all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. The President- article II states that the Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-President chosen for the same Term. Lastly is the section three of the judiciary that says; the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Framers’ rationale for a separation of powers in the US Constitution attempts to move beyond the general functional/formal debate by analyzing the views of the contemporary Court’s leading separation of powers functionalist, Justice White, and his effort to create a meaningful doctrine. Faction is the conflict within a nation. Madison in federal paper 10 addresses the question of how to guard against factions, groups of citizens with interests contrary to the rights of others or the interests of the whole community. Republic is an authority derived through the election by the people of public officials best fitted to represent them, while Democracy is a government of the masses whereby authority is derived through mass meeting or any other form of direct expression. When we compare and contrast the political view of young Madison with mature Madison, it depicts that when he was young, he distrusts political parties and democracy; while he believed that government should reflect the will of the majority, when he got mature. Dahl argues that an individual voter in a state with a smaller population has greater weight than a voter in the more populated state. The reason is that both African Americans and Hispanics are substantially underrepresented due to their greater presence in high-population states as compared to in low-population states. Dahl likes the proportional representation of national elections using a parliamentary system. The advantages are; Parliamentary systems are characterized by no clear-cut separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, leading to a different set of checks and balances compared to those found in presidential systems, are usually have a clear differentiation between the head of government and the head of state, with the head of government being the prime minister, and the head of state often being the president. The disadvantages of parliamentary systems are; In Presidential system, executive branch in separately elected, meaning that there’s no direct responsibility, numerous, fragmented party system, fusion of powers, dangerous for young democracies. First-past-the-post election system is a single-winner voting system often used to elect executive officers or to elect members of a legislative assembly which is based on single-member constituencies. Having a right to vote has helped due to the expansion of various amendments like; universal suffrage which describe a situation in which the right to vote is not restricted by race, gender, belief or social status. Framers decide to use an electoral college for presidential selection because Electors are technically free to vote for anyone eligible to be President, but in practice pledge to vote for specific candidates and voters cast ballots for favored presidential candidates by voting for correspondingly pledged electors. The electoral college works by allocating each state a number of Electors equal to the number of its U. S. Senators (always 2) plus the number of its U. S. Representatives (which may change each decade according to the size of each State’s population as determined in the Census). A constitution can be amended by proposing an amendment and ratifying an amendment. The president can be removed from the office on impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High crimes and misdemeanors. â€Å"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined†¦Ã¢â‚¬  is what Madison said and it is still true up to date. Intent bill of rights was meant to protect the state from the federal interference. The most important on e is the English bill of rights. The tenth amendment states that â€Å"The States should be left to do whatever they can do as well as the federal government†. It reassures the states that they would remain largely in charge within their own borders. Majoritarianism is a traditional political philosophy or agenda which asserts that a majority (sometimes categorized by religion, language, or some other identifying factor) of the population is entitled to a certain degree of primacy in society, and has the right to make decisions that affect the society. The political theory of pluralism holds that political power in society does not lie with the electorate, or with small concentrated elite, but is distributed between a wide numbers of groups. Elite theory is a theory of the state which seeks to describe and explain the power relationships in modern society. It argues that a small minority, consisting of members of the economic elite and policy-planning networks, hold the most power no matter what happens in elections in a country. Yes, the judicial is independent of the other branches of the government and external forces. The reason for this is to prevent corruption. The first amendment is an absolute right. John Peter Zenger was a German-born American printer, publisher, editor and journalist in New York City Zenger’s trial was significant because he was fighting for the freedom of speech. Libel is the communication of a statement that makes a false claim, expressly stated or implied to be factual, that may give an individual, business, product, group, government or nation a negative image. Obscenity is a term that is most often used in a legal context to describe expressions (words, images, actions) that offend the prevalent sexual morality of the time. Business administration consists of the performance or management of business operations and thus the making or implementing of major decisions while public administration is the development, implementation and study of branches of government policy. Common law refers to law and the corresponding legal system developed through decisions of courts and similar tribunals, rather than through legislative statutes or executive action. Case law is that body of reported judicial opinions in countries that have common law legal systems. It includes courts’ interpretations of statutes, and also constitutional provisions and administrative rules. Statutory law is written law set down by a legislature or other governing authority such as the executive branch of government in response to a perceived need to clarify the functioning of government, improve civil order, to codify existing law, or for an individual or company to obtain special treatment. The U. S. House of Representatives and then the U. S. Senate are the one who declares war. Yes, the Congress has the authority to veto state legislation. One of the intentions of the founders in designing a new constitution was to ensure that the federal government had sufficient power to run the country. The Supremacy Clause is the common name given to Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which reads: â€Å"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding†. Public administration is boring because it’s full of bureaucracies. Politics is the process by which groups of people make decisions. Politics is generally applied to behavior within civil governments, but politics has been observed in all human group interactions, including corporate, academic, and religious institutions. Politics consists of social relations involving authority or power, and refers to the regulation of a political unit and to the methods and tactics used to formulate and apply policy.

Teaching People About Other Cultures Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Teaching People About Other Cultures - Essay Example This essay declares that teachers lack the cultural understanding of the immigrant students and hence fail to understand them in the classrooms. Furthermore, this children also face hardships whenever they are trying to become adopted in the learning system. This is majorly due to social mobility and financial constrains as most of them are undocumented students. Teachers on the other hand can face difficulties while trying to deal with a class of immigrant children. The children have a wide range of needs ranging from unique emotional needs to community conflicts. The best solution for such teachers is to utilize such immigrant students in the classrooms since they have much to offer in the learning community. This students push learning institutions to adopt innovative teaching and interacting strategies such as diverse communication skills. This paper makes a conclusion that it is essential for most learning institutions to integrate various teaching models such as the cultural straddle model so as to assist students and teachers with problems in adopting cultural diversification. With this model, learning institutions will be able to equip teachers with the required ability to relate to the students and share a diversified ground. Cultural competency is advantageous to all institutions as it fosters interactions and team effort regardless of individual’s background. The cultural and racial competence is an important skill for teachers to adopt as it enhances teaching skills and thinking.

Book Review on the Gospel according to Mattew Essay

Book Review on the Gospel according to Mattew - Essay Example Just like Paul who had a Hebrew name Shaoul, Matthew had Levi as his original name. Matthew, son of Alpheus (Mark 2:14) came from Galilee. However, he is thought to have lived in Antioch, Syria. He collected taxes for Herod Antipas, a Jewish leader, ruler of Galilee and Peraea between 4 BCE and 39 CE.1 Just after following Jesus, Matthew held a feast in his house where tax collectors and sinners recline at the table with the Christ and his disciples. This is where Jesus drew protest from the Pharisees. The author, however, had a great influence on the development of Christianity. It based most of his writing on Mark’s gospel.2 The Gospel of Matthew is the first book in the 27 books of the New Testament. In the New Testament, the following books are Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, The Acts, Romans, 1 Corinthians, 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 Thessalonians, 2 Thessalonians, 1 Timothy, 2 Timothy, Titus, Philemon, Hebrews, James, 1 Peter, 2 Peter, 1 John, 2 John , 3 John, Jude, Revelation. Aside from one of the first twelve disciples of Jesus (Matthew 9:1; 10:1-4) and an eye-witness, Matthew records more of Jesus teaching concerning Gods heavenly kingdom than the other writers, for example the entire Sermon on the Mount. Matthew, compared to the first few men (Peter, Andrew, James, and John) whom Jesus chose (who were fishermen), was skilled that he handled accounts of figures being a tax collector and obviously equipped with the pen. More so, he chose to leave his ludicrous post to be with Jesus and become an evangelist. It is to be recalled when a certain man holding many riches wants to be one of Christ’s disciples. Jesus told this man â€Å"If you want to be perfect, go sell your belongings and give to the poor and you will have treasure in heaven, and come be my follower.† However, the man refused to let go of his belongings and went away grieved. (Matthew: 19:21-22). Quoted on Papias, one

Operations and Materials Management Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Operations and Materials Management - Essay Example Companies keep on upgrading themselves to gain competitive edge and keep up with changing demands and preferences of consumers. This paper is to observe and analyze the operations and materials management of three firms- McDonalds, world wide chain of fast food restaurant; Panda Express, a fast food Asian cuisine restaurant; Wendy’s, quick service hamburger company. Â   All the three companies have a well set operations management that focuses on acquiring the raw material cost effectively; process the raw material to make it ready to bring it out to the shelf for the final use by consumer. This is typical of the Wendy’s operations and its business strategy (Stevenson, 1996). The common thing about the three large firms is that all three have well planned and strategically designed Standard Operating Procedures in addition to their indigenous solution in relation to the nature of industry they are thriving in. In order to avoid huge amount of capital investment in acqu iring and building the infrastructure, McDonalds and Panda Express sells franchisee to local investors. McDonalds is a fast food restaurant catering to all classes of consumers across its chain of set ups globally; it relies on providing fresh food to its consumers in the quickest time possible. The key to its success globally irrespective of the geographical or cultural barriers has been its use of Just In Time (JIT) inventory management system. This system keeps a complete track of the available stock against the current and future demand of the raw material. It helps avoiding overstocking and under stocking at any given time; thus, ensuring healthy and fresh food for consumers (MacDonald, 2000, p. 263). The McDonalds’ management strategically makes a decision on keeping the labor cost low by scheduling the roster as per the store rush depending on peak and non-peak hours. Scheduling of staff roster is one strategy that has been found to be common to all the three companies being analyzed. In all the cases, there is a team of trained staff, where each member is not only specialized to perform a specific task, but also trained to handle more tasks at the same time in case they are required to do so. The companies encourage multi-tasking at their establishments. It helps in scheduling the roster on the basis of peak and non-peak hours; as the staff strength is generally kept low during the non-peak hours, which requires every team member to handle more than just their specific task. On the other hand, during the non-peak hours the work force at all the three firms is so stationed that one individual handles one desk that he specializes in. The well planned and consistent operation process across their chain of establishments and trained staff ensures low cost and improve the overall efficiency. The operating systems adopted by the three firms are primarily the same irrespective of the level an employee holds in the organization. Costs associated with op erations maintenance and monitoring in a company can generally be put under five different headers, which are plant, inventory, labor, raw materials, and distribution. All the costs associated with a company can broadly be classified into two categories, fixed costs and variable costs. As the terms imply, fixed costs are the ones that are incurred irrespective of the running status of a firm and variable costs are ones that are incurred at various stages of operations, like equipment maintenances, labor costs, plant

Cattle Industry Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Cattle Industry - Essay Example Cattle are raised in three phases before it is processed. Calves are first raised on pasture and raised land. They are then sold to a stock feeder who builds them around nine hundred to thousand pounds by allowing them to feed on pasture, crop residue and range land and finally go to feedlots where they are fattened with high-protein feed for slaughter. At the slaughterhouse the carcass is divided into â€Å"cuts†. Earlier the sides of beef would go to wholesalers but now disassembly occurs at the plant itself. After slaughter one portion goes directly to the wholesalers who distribute to institutional users or grocery stores. The grocery chains are directly linked to the packers. Another portion goes for processing into hot dogs or sausages or other forms of meat. It is then canned or frozen for further consumption. The bacterial count has to be kept low while storing so that spoilage is minimum. This is done through plant cleanliness, careful slaughter procedures and keeping temperatures low so that bacteria multiply at a low rate. Transportation is done in refrigerated trucks and spoilage and distribution too has become easy due to vertical integration of firms that deal with packed food. The links in the commodity chain have reduced as even restaurant chains are forming tighter linkages with packers, feedlots and stock feeders.

Learning disabilities are fatal in organization Essay

Learning disabilities are fatal in organization - Essay Example In these days, there are lots of methods and modes that are being catered to analyze and solve certain issues and problems. We can see this through theories and other set of explanations which sought to analyze and identify predicaments within our society and also to other fields of leaning like in the fields of natural sciences and health sciences. Because of these, they are now a wide scope of critical thinking which is good because it tends to shape our world to a competent and creative society - able to offer an effective solution thru competent analysis and creative thinking. In this paper, we will be dealing on one of the most brilliant ideas on how to attain and obtain as well, a productive and fruitful organization. It is brilliant because of its realistic approach which tends to directly oppose hindrances that could make an organization or company in its growth. As Senge (1990) would suggest, we should also focus on disabilities rather than always on the brighter or good sid e because this could also help us to find ways to prevent such crisis or other negative phenomenon in occurrence. Because if we could identify these co-called disabilities, we could find ways to stop it and deal with it ahead of time; whilst avoiding it to obstruct our company’s or organization’s progress. ... ive in our own way having a unique elucidation to overcome the predicaments that will threaten our organization or company’s advancement as well as its existence. Therefore, we shall be explicitly see those solutions suggested by Senge (1990) through looking at disabilities to have a keen idea of which would be to focus to attain maximum development and to have a fine sense to where would be the weak points and areas that could be the source of conflict or malfunctions. Because if we could identify this weakness or disabilities, it could be a source of strength in the future by improving this and diverting it to an asset – making our company transform and transcend to a better and more proficient to solutions. The Learning Disabilities In the article made by Douglas Cathon (2000), he mentioned there the seven disabilities introduced by Senge (1990). We shall be tackling those ones in this part and identify them to have a broader knowledge on the efficacy that it will br ought to the progression of the companies and/or organizations. First disability would be the â€Å"I am my position† (p. 5), that states that one of the impediment to attain development is because of the too much in depth to the mentality of one’s person to their job that it already become as part of their personality or their personal identity in their everyday living. In this sense, what would be the problem is the single minded thinking. This obstructs the chance for individual to attain more ideas as well as positive change by being stagnant of the status quo where we are into. We do not embrace new circumstances that would contribute to our own wellness and success. Also, it would limit individual to see their accountability and responsibility. They only focus on what they do and feel

Tempur Pedic Quality Process Improvement Plan Essay

Tempur Pedic Quality Process Improvement Plan - Essay Example As Hill writes, "top management determines quality priorities, establishes the systems of quality, management and the procedures to be followed, provides resources and leads by example" (Hill, 1991). The concept emerged from the work in statistical quality control at the Western Electric Hawthorne plant in the 1930s and was associated with the work of W. Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran (Chase, Jacobs, 2003). It was introduced to Japan by the Americans as the occupying force in the immediate post war era and found its greatest expression in Japanese manufacturing industry. Literature review. Two themes in the research literature have been particularly prominent in recent years: "the ways of improvement" as a source of service planning and the debate over the different methods and models of successful production technoques. Up-to-date scholarship on both of these themes is reflected in recent researches R.B. Chase, R.F. Jacobs (2003), N. Slack, S. Chambers, R. Johnston (2003), D. Dow (1999), etc. In their works these authors develop a new theoretical approach which can be applied to practice. The works they provide a lot of example of management teams and their experience in TQM. These researches join theoretical and practical side of strategy, giving recommendations for improvement in the TQM to ensure customer satisfaction. "Production and A big layer of literature concerning this topic belongs to such gurus as T. Hill "Production and Operation Management: Text and cases" (1991), N. D. Harris "Service Operations Management" (1989). Their theoretical studies on improvements based on TQM, sustainable competitive advantage, the role of standards, etc, are still the basis of any research in the field of production and operations management. They examine and discuss the role of different companies for product and service improvement can successfully use TQM. Internal factors. Monitoring of the environment is an important method that helps to search for new trends in operations management. Managers should take into account internal and external factors that influence a potential consumer. The policy of implement restructing sooner rather than later was proved to be correct. There is no two cuctomers with the similar requiments, that is why operations management must respond to different customer needs. Factors Internal to a company are types of workers, organization structure, assumptions about people, technology, vision, mission and values of the firm, n ature of ow nership and management. Tempur Pedic is a Swedish Company which manufactures and distributes mattresses and pillows made from its proprietary "Tempur" pressure-relieving material. This material consists of a visco-elastic material that conforms to the body to provide support and help alleviate pressure points.The company operates in 60 countries around the world. In a time of rapidly changing technologies and ever-shorter product life cycles, product development often proceeds at a glacial pace. In an age of the customer, order fulfillment has high error rates and customer enquiries go unanswered for weeks. In a period when asset utilization is critical, inventory levels exceed many months of demand. The usual methods of boosting performance - process rationalization and automation - haven't yielded the dramatic improvements for Tempur Pedic Company need. In particular, heavy

Prevention of Central Line Associated Blood Stream Infections Through Research Paper

Prevention of Central Line Associated Blood Stream Infections Through Education - Research Paper Example CLABSIs have been estimated to occur in the United States hospitals in the range of 250, 000-500, 000 cases annually. This has resulted in high costs of care for patients who have been hospitalized. The need to cut down the costs associated with CLABSIs resulted in research aimed at developing a feasible solution. Research has yielded a mechanism that will see nurses educated on best practices that will them take an active role in the prevention of CLABSIs. This paper will focus on implementation of a plan to prevent central line associated blood stream infections by way of educating nurses. Problem Identification and Importance According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), every year an estimated 41,000 Central line associated blood stream infections occur in hospitals in U.S. The infections are typically serious and result in protracted stay in hospitals with increased costs. These infections also come with an increased risk of mortality (CDC, 2012). CLABSI (central line assoc iated blood stream infections) are typically prevented by proper management of the central line. CLABSIs are considered to be part of healthcare associated infections (HAIs) and have been reported to responsible for mortality ranging from 12-15%. In a study conducted by CDC, the findings revealed that approximately 43,000 CLABSIs occurred in hospitalized patients in ICU in U.S hospitals. There was a reduction in the number of CLABSIs by approximately 18000 in the year 2009. CLABSIs resulting from Staphyloccocus aureus represented the greatest decrease than even the gram negative rods like Candida spp and Enterococcus spp. In the same year, 23,000 CLABSIs occurred among inpatient individuals in the inpatient wards of U.S hospitals. In the year 2008, approximately 37, 000 CLABSIs occurred in outpatient clients receiving outpatient hemodialysis (CDC, 2011). These statistics serve to underscore the importance of CLABSIs in U.S hospitals. CLABSIs have resulted in an increased cost of med ical treatment. Hospitalized persons are paying huge amounts of money for their medical costs (Moe, 2012). It is this CLABSI associated costs that created a need for research activities that would see the CLABSIs kept to a minimum. The research activities have resulted in current evidence based guidelines that when executed, the incidence of CLABSIs will reduce. The mechanism requires that nurses be educated on prevention of CLABSIs. CLABSIs are not only responsible for high medical cost but are also responsible for morbidity and mortality in pediatric and neonatal intensive care units (Bizzarro, 2011). According to Bizzaro (2011), although implementation of evidence based catheter care bundles has reduced the infection rates, CLABSIs remain a fundamental problem in the pediatric and neonatal critical care units. CLABSIs are responsible for both pediatric, neonatal and adult morbidity and mortality in U.S citizens. Costs According to a study conducted by Shannon, et al (2006), the i nfections that are acquired while in hospital add considerable mortality and morbidity to patient care. A detailed economic analysis of the hospital expenses and revenues in 54 patient cases who had contracted central line associated blood stream infections over a period of three years in two intensive care units was conducted. The financial data was compared to data of other patients who were of

John Gatto Essay Example for Free

John Gatto Essay John Gatto uses many persuasive techniques to try and convince the reader that the reform of schools is necessary. He begins by including the audience that he is talking to in his ‘speech like’ manner â€Å"I accept this award on behalf of all of the fine teachers I’ve known over the years† this establishes personal contact with the audience and develops an appropriate register, therefore persuading them to agree with any further comments that he makes. To further support this, the writer goes on to suggest that teachers are not the problem, as he sees it, but school as an institution â€Å"although teachers do care and do work very hard, the institution they work in is psychopathic†. The writer uses the present tense throughout the entire article to highlight the immediacy of the situation and convince the reader that reform is needed. Gatto’s use of repetition of words like â€Å"useless† and â€Å"absurd† are used part way through the text in order to not only make a more forceful point, but also to emphasise the way that he feels. By repeating these negatively charged words he is attempting to influence the way reader would feel about education, therefore persuading them that reform is a necessity. He establishes the idea that reform is necessary with use of a rhetorical question â€Å"What can be done?† to not only guide the reader towards a solution but also to indicate that he will be offering a solution that the reader will agree with. Gatto uses the structure of short sentences in order to develop his argument and focus on key points, almost like a list – a way of simplifying his ideas. A single short sentence is further used â€Å" Schools are intended to produce formulaic human beings whose behaviour can be predicted and controlled.† to enhance the writer’s view about schools, therefore strengthening his argument and persuading his readership to agree that reform is wholly necessary. The use of the word ‘intended’ coupled with ‘formulaic, predicted and controlled’ to describe how children are taught further gains support from the audience about the immediacy for educational reform. To conclude, the writer has used this conversational tone throughout the text in order to make the reader feel as if he is speaking directly to them and thus forming a strong connection. He closes the article in an abrupt manner in order to focus the attention of the listener on the solution and uses a respectful close to make the listener feel that they have been a part of this discussion, further persuading them to feel as though they should act upon the cause that the writer is so passionate and emotional about. â€Å"The curriculum of family is at the heart of any good life†¦. Time to return to it. Enough. I’ve said my piece. Thank you.†

Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant

Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Introduction ‘Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. (Aristotle: 1094a1-3). Philosophy has always been concerned with trying to determine why we do the actions we do: what are we hoping to achieve by performing certain actions? The above quote is Aristotles opening sentence in the Nicomachean ethics, but how are we actually meant to achieve this good that we are aiming for? Many people in the world would be happy to support the claim that the good is achieved by being virtuous but what exactly does this entail? For Aristotle, ‘moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (Aristotle: 1103a16-17) and ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2). It then seems we are safe to claim that the good, (â€Å"moral excellence†), corresponds with happiness, but was he right? And does this happiness include pleasure, or is it excluded? Are virtue and pleasure synonymous? Can they even exist harmoniously at all? Throughout the history of thought, philosophers have attempted to discern that element of human nature that can be most aptly described as the action of taking pleasure in doing certain actions, and in the consequences that arise from any given action. The role of virtue in this pleasure process has been assessed and criticised for hundreds of years; does being virtuous give us pleasure, or does pleasure distract us from doing virtuous things? Is happiness the key to a moral life? My aim in this essay is to address these questions, and related questions, according to the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. In doing so, I aim to discover what the relation between virtue and pleasure really is, according to these two philosophers. My aim is to discover what the role is of both virtue and pleasure, and the connection between them, in the works of both philosophers, and try to establish where the two philosophies align, and where they are incompatible. At first, it seems as though both philosophers are wholly incompatible in their views of where our morality, our motivation to strive for the good, comes from. Even how the two define what the good is seems to differ too much to offer any similarities. As I briefly mentioned in my opening paragraph, for Aristotle, the purpose of human life is the good, and ‘the highest of all goods achievable by action is happiness. And [many] identify living well and faring well with being happy (Aristotle: 1095a16-19). For Kant however, the question of morality is wrapped up in the concept of â€Å"duty† ‘he does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth (Kant 1997: 4:398). In this essay I will explain exactly what both meant, and critically assess their ideas, with the ultimate goal of somehow reconciling the two seemingly opposing viewpoints. In the process of doing this I will first give an explanation of the foundations of these views what part of each philosophers lifes work these ideas about morality have arisen from. Background When examining any philosophical theory I think it is of vital importance to understand how those particular ideas have been formed what part of the writers thought and theories have these ideas originated from? In this section, I will give a brief overview of whereabouts in their respective works do Kant and Aristotle expound their views on morality, in reference to both pleasure and virtue. Aristotles Nicomachean ethics is part of his practical philosophy (along with his Eudemian ethics), and is primarily a search for what the ultimate goal of human life is. Aristotle was a student of Plato, and as such was likely to have been influenced by his philosophy. It is nothing new to philosophy to be preoccupied with morality. Arguably Platos greatest work, The Republic is fundamentally an inquiry into morality and justice, and what sort of society would be best for cultivating â€Å"the moral man†. In book II of The Republic, Plato tells a story of the mythical ring of Gyges, which is a ring that renders the wearer invisible. Glaucon (the teller of this story in the dialogue) claims that no man, no matter how virtuous or just he is, could resist acting immorally if there was no danger of punishment (Plato: 359c-360c). Glaucon does not believe that any man who had no consequences to face would be moral his claim is that we are moral because society forces us to be so, through fear of being reprimanded. In this case, morality becomes a social construct, and has nothing to do with the singular man who would dismiss moral behaviour in an instant if he believed he could avoid castigation. Aristotles ethics do not follow this way of reasoning, he believes that man can be moral within himself, and also that a man is not virtuous simply by performing virtuous actions, ‘his action must [also] proceed from a firm and unchangeable character (Aristotle: 1105a32-33). Aristotle is often misquoted about what he really meant, due to a mistranslation of the original Greek. Aristotle describes the goal of human life as eudaimonia, which is oft translated as happiness. However, the original meaning of this word is something more akin to being ‘blessed as regards ones own spirit (Pakaluk 2005: 47), or more literally, human flourishing. Pakaluk (2005) goes on to explain the fundamental differences between our commonplace definition of happiness and how we must understand it as a translation of eudaimonia. Most importantly we must understand that Aristotles happiness is not a hedonistic happiness where ‘pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of act ion (OED 1989). Eudaimonia is a stable, lasting condition, one that does not fluctuate according to day-to-day events it is an ultimate goal rather than a temporary one. It is also objectively universal it is not a subjective condition based upon the wants of each individual it is a state of being, not a mood or inclination, which is similar for all human beings and is characterised as living well ‘the happy man lives well and fares well (Aristotle: 1098b20). Aristotles definition of virtue is also similarly misunderstood. The original Greek is arete which means ‘any sort of excellence or distinctive power (Pakaluk 2005: 5). Thus being a virtuous person means possessing a certain sort of excellence (of character) which leads us to act virtuously. This form of morality bases the value of any action on the character of the agent an agent must be ‘a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or non-actions (Pojman 2002: 160). We cannot take morality from the actions in themselves, because virtue can be demonstrated through the conscious omission of any certain action morality must instead be based upon the agent. For Kant, his views of how pleasure can affect the goodness, or virtue, of any action can be found most clearly in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The Groundwork (1786) comes between the two different versions of the Critique of Pure Reason that were published (1781 and 1787), and there is certainly a crossover of concepts, with Kant utilising some of the arguments of the Critique in the Groundwork. Namely, his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, respectively, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. This distinction between the true essence of things, and their appearances provides us with ‘two standpoints from which [man] can regard himself and cognize laws for all of his actions (Kant 1987: 4:452). The aim of the Groundwork is to ‘proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle (Kant 1997: 4:392). In other words, Kant wants to start from the common perception that every action has some sort of moral value and discover what the underlying principle of morality is, that causes this presupposition. This supreme principle that we uncover must be a synthetic a priori one we must be able to deduce it from what we already know, because we are trying to discern how we ought to be from the evidence of how we are. The Groundwork is the quest to discover what this principle is. According to Kant a virtuous person is someone who performs the right actions for the right reasons (which seems to be similar with Aristotles view the action itself does not hold any value the value instead lies within the agents intent). A person who acts thus demonstrates a good will, which is the only thing to which we attribute total merit ‘It is impossible to think of anything that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Kant 1997: 4:393). This good will possesses worth completely independently of any circumstances, both the means and the ends are good. ‘Even if this will should yet achieve nothing, then [it is still] something that has it full worth in itself In other words, the good will does not need to achieve its end in order to be good, merely the attempt is so. Kant then introduces the concept of duty in order to explain how we are able to manifest the good will in our actions. The concept of duty ‘contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making in unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly (Kant 1997: 4:397). If we do our duty from duty (i.e. for its own sake, because it is the right thing to do, rather than due to some other inclination or motivating desire) then we are doing the right actions for the right reasons we are being virtuous. Kant uses formulations of his categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how we can determine what our duty is, although I will not go into them in this chapter. Kant shows that any system used to deduce our duty must be categorical, and not hypothetical, because a hypothetical imperative tells you how to achieve a certain end if you will x, then you must also will y in order to be able to achieve x. A hypothetical imperative is conditional, it depends on something else. A categorical imperative cannot be so it tells us what we ought to do unconditionally, not on the condition of something else. Kant uses his formulations of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate when we can say an act is done from duty or not. If an act is done from duty for dutys sake, then it is a virtuous action, if not, then it is not, even if the action is not necessarily â€Å"bad†. Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle Virtue can be taken to have several different meanings; the dictionary definition is ‘conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice (OED 1989). For Aristotle the idea of virtue is the mean between two vices, stray but a little from the middle, and you are no longer being wholly virtuous. This Aristotelian view of virtue is often seen as in direct opposition to the Kantian view of virtue that the virtuous man is the man who acts solely from the motivation of wanting to do his duty, without enjoying the act at all. I will explain in full whether this common view of Kantian ethics is correct in the following chapter, and in this chapter I will explain what I mean by my definition of Aristotelian virtue, and exactly what that signifies in relation to pleasure. Aristotles ethics are usually defined as virtue ethics they are agent centred, and depend (like Kant) not on the act that is done, but instead on what sort of person we need to be, what sort of character we need to have, in order to be able to commit virtuous acts. Aristotle starts off the Nicomachean ethics by trying to discern what the goal of human life is, and in book one manages to come up with what standards he thinks this goal must adhere to what are the characteristics this ultimate goal must have in order to be classed as such? Aristotle states that ‘we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be: for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else (Aristotle: 1097a34-1097b1). Our ultimate goal, the highest good, must be desired for itself only, and not as a means to something else. Aristotle refers to this ultimate goal of human life as eudaimonia, but what does this really mean? Does eudaimonia equate to hedonistic pleasure? Accordingly to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not synonymous with pleasure, he states that ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2), so happiness is the achievement of pure excellence, or of complete virtuousness. Human flourishing is what we achieve when we successfully fulfil the human function when we excel at what it is that makes us distinctly human. This means, that in order to understand this ‘human flourishing which is the ultimate goal of human life, we also need to understand the function of human beings ‘Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. (Aristotle: 1097b22-25). Aristotle believed that everything in the world has an â€Å"ergon†, a function, which is ‘that for the sake of which it exists; therefore the achieving of this work, or, more precisely, its doing so well, is its good; but only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well (Pakaluk 2005: 75). For example, the function of a knife is to cut things, so a good knife must be able to cut things well, therefore a good knife must be sharp. If there is to be a human function, then it will be what makes us essentially human what it is that separates us from everything el se in the world the thing that we are best capable of. But what makes Aristotle believe that humans necessarily have to have a function? Aristotle claims that it is merely common sense that man should have a function, because everything else in the world does ‘Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? Is he naturally functionless? (Aristotle: 1097b29-30). It seems clear that man must have a function just as any other thing does. So what is this function? If something only achieves its function well if it possesses the certain virtues that make it a good thing of its kind (like sharpness for the knife) then the human function must be something that is best achieved by humans more than anything else in the world. Or even, it may be something that is only achievable by human beings. ‘A virtue is a trait that makes a thing of a certain kind good and in view of which we call a thing of that kind â€Å"good†. (Pakaluk 2005: 75). In this way, Aristotles function argument follows on to an investigation into what qualities human beings possess, what virtues they possess in their character, that makes them distinctively human. In order to find out what the human function is, we need to find something that is distinctive to humans. It cannot be merely living, as that is shared with even plants, and it cannot be perception, because although that rules out plants, it still includes the animal kingdom. Instead the human function must be ‘an active life of the element that has a rational principle (Aristotle: 1098a3-4). In other words the human function, that element of human beings which is characteristic to us alone, is our capability to reason; our rationality. Of course, this definition of the human function as rationality causes some problems in the case of people who have diminished rationality what does this mean for them? Take, for example, the mentally handicapped who have reduced capacities of reason through no fault of their own are they really less capable of living fulfilling and flourishing lives than â€Å"normal† people? Are they â€Å"less good†? It seems as though, according to this argument, we are required to count them as worth less. However, I will not dwell on this problem, as I am more concerned with what this idea of a function implies for the role of pleasure in Aristotles ethics. What then, does it mean that the human function is our capacity to reason? The human function is what we must achieve excellence in, in order to be â€Å"good† (just as the knife must achieve excellence in its function of sharpness, in order to be a good knife). This means that morality, and consequently virtue, are intrinsically linked to the human function, to our rationality it is our reason that allows us to achieve virtue. We must use our reason in order to discern what is virtuous. Our function of rationality is what allows us to achieve our excellence, to achieve our virtue. So how does our reason allow us to achieve our virtue? It allows us to choose whatever course of action we feel would allow us best to achieve our happiness, our telos (ultimate goal). Hursthouse (1991) reads Aristotle as meaning that an action is regarded as â€Å"right† because it is what a virtuous person would choose to do, but is it not the other way round? Does a virtuous person not choose to do certain acts because they are good? This problem is obviously reminiscent of Euthyphros dilemma from the platonic dialogue of the same name is a certain act considered good because God says it is so, or does God say it is so because it is good. For Aristotle the ability to choose the morally right action in any situation is an ability to follow the moral mean ‘that moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense is it so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency (Aristotle: 1109a1-3). So for example, the virtue of bravery is the mean between cowardice and rashness. Aristotle also states that virtue is dependent on our character if we have the right character we will be predisposed to commit actions of the right sort. ‘Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind (Aristotle: 1103b20-22). Therefore, if we habitually perform the right sort of action, then we will generate the right sort of character, thus enabling us to almost automatically choose the correct action, which sits in the middle of this scale between virtue and vice. Our eudaimonia is more and m ore fulfilled by each instance in which our character â€Å"automatically† chooses the virtuous action. Does this idea of virtue as the mean between two vices imply that pleasure is then a vice, being the vice at one end of the scale of the virtue of moderation, whilst the other end is despair? A virtue can be best described as the course of action that allows us to achieve our eudaimonia. So is pleasure more suited to this task than despair (if we take despair to be the other end of the scale)? Would the mean on the scale in actuality lie closer to the end of pleasure than the other? Is this a purely arithmetical mean, the exact midpoint between two extremes, or is it something more flexible? Just as everyone requires different amounts of food in their everyday life (such that everyones â€Å"mean† between scarcity and gluttony differs), would it not make sense that the mean of enjoyment is different for everyone as well? Such that enjoyment of life, whilst it does not mean a slavish commitment to complete hedonistic pleasure, could mean that pleasure does play an important rol e in our lives. I believe that Aristotle would agree with me here, since he states that ‘no one nature or state is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the same pleasure (Aristotle: 1153b29-30). In other words, we do not all desire the same pleasures to the same degree, instead we pursue only those pleasures which are best suited to helping each of us, as an individual, to achieve our eudaimonia. We can therefore agree with Shermans reading of Aristotle, that ‘moral habituation is the cultivation of fine (or noble) pleasures and pains (Sherman 1989: 190). In this way, virtuousness does not mean a complete abandonment of all pleasure, but instead tells us that we should be interested in only those pleasures which are â€Å"worthy† of the rational mind. In some ways this bears similarity with Mills recalculation of Benthams utilitarianism that some pleasures (of the intellect) are worth more in the hedonic calculus than mere physical pleasures (Mill 2001). However, appreciation of the right pleasures is a taught skill also. By that I mean one of habit, such as virtue is according to Aristotle, and as such ‘we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained in the things that we ought (Aristotle: 1104b11-13). What is slightly problematic is that Aristotle gives two seemingly wholly different accounts of what pleasure is. In Book II he states that ‘it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things (Aristotle: 1104b10), by this meaning that a love of pleasure for itself will lead us to ignore the virtuous path and live a life of pure hedonism, thus failing to achieve our telos of eudaimonia. In Book VII he states that ‘the view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket (Aristotle: 1153a17-18). This view is nonsensical, and would lead us to having to avoiding almost every type of activity. Some pleasures are bad, but this does not necessarily make all pleasures bad. However, whilst these two accounts do differ, there is a common theme between them, which is that pleasure is not necessarily bad, and can exist in harmony with virtue. However, we need to qualify exactly what pleasures we mean here, as not all pleasure can be called good. Annas (1980) interprets Aristotle as believing that pleasure is only good when done by the virtuousness man, because the habit of his character will lead him to only choose to act on those pleasures which are virtuous ‘it is right for the good man to seek pleasure; pleasure will point him in the right direction. (Annas 1980: 286). Whereas the man who is immoral in habit will only persue those pleasures which ‘confirm the deplorable tendencies of [him], since it will strengthen his habits of wickedness and weakness (Annas 1980: 286-7). Here, the important point is not that we need to avoid pleasure, but that we need to be sure that we are pursuing the right kind of pleasure before we act upon it the pl easure of the virtuous man, not the deplorable man. The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Annas at first glance seems to be claiming that only a good person can access pleasure in a good way. Where does this leave the immoral man who wishes to reform his character? Is there no possibility that he will be able to choose those pleasures that are good for his character? Is this what Aristotle is really saying when he claims that virtue is a matter of habit, of character? ‘If the things [the good man] finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition. (Aristotle: 1176a19-22). This quote for one certainly seems to be suggesting that the virtuous man will be able to steer clear of immoral pleasures, whilst the immoral man will not. Aristotle emphasizes several times the fact that his ethics is based upon repeated behaviour, on habit, and ‘a short time [or virtuousness], does not make a man blessed or happy (Aristotle: 1098a18-19). What this means is that a period of immorality in a mans life does not necessarily preclude him from ever achieving his eudaimonia, and similarly, a brief period of virtuousness does not make a man wholly virtuous. Aristotles ethics is a system of right and wrong that demonstrates itself through habit, and habits can change, although it may be hard to dispose of bad habits, of immoral habits, because ‘it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion [for immoral pleasures] (Aristotle:1105a2-3). This does not mean that it is impossible, indeed it must be possible to change our character, otherwise what we are taught in our youth would be how we remain for life, meaning that whether we become a good or a bad person depends mor e on our teachers, rather than any attempt at morality by ourselves. We cannot be deprived of a chance at our eudaimonia just because we fail to receive the right training of character in our youth. It must be possible to reform and for the immoral man to pursue good pleasure or how else can he become a man who chooses only good pleasures out of habit? Some might claim that this seems unfair. If moral virtue is merely an act brought about by habit, then it is far easier for the good man to be virtuous that it is for the bad man to be so so where is the incentive for the bad man to change his ways and attempt to cultivate the right sort of character in order to be good by habit? But ‘even the good is better when it is harder (Aristotle: 1105a10), and the bad man will be rewarded if he perseveres. If a bad man successfully changes his character to that of the virtuous man, then he is satisfying the human function, the human ergon, and he will be able to achieve the ultimate telos for human beings eudaimonia his human flourishing. The incentive for the bad man to change his ways, no matter how difficult it may be, is that he will achieve the ultimate goal of complete happiness. In this way does the right sort of pleasure, lead first to the cultivation of a habit of character of complete excellence or virtue, which in turn then leads to ultimate happiness. However, as Hutchinson (1986) points out, there is a problem with this idea that, ultimately, restraint over which pleasures we decide to pursue is how we describe virtue. If ‘discipline produces virtue and, when misguided, defect of character, by means of pleasure and pain, the virtues (and vices) are dispositions for enjoying and disliking things (Hutchinson 1986: 79). Hutchinson goes on to state that this cannot be so, because children are rewarded in the study of arithmetic through pleasure and pain. So then ‘arithmetical skill is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain mathematical operations. And that is not true; it is simply a disposition to come to the right answer (Hutchinson 1986: 79). For Hutchinson Aristotles argument is unsuccessful merely because it is too vague, a vagueness which allows for the arithmetical comparison to be made, and this would not be a fault suffered if the argument was constructed with more care. Ultimately, this means that although th e argument is open to criticism, it leaves Aristotle quite confident in his claim that virtue is a form of character, created by the repeated habit of choosing the correct moral path that of the virtue at the mean point between two vices. And it is this mean point which will ultimately lead to eudaimonia. As long as pleasure is taken in moderation, it can still be synonymous with virtue, and allows for pleasure to be a part of our eudaimonia, the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Virtue and Pleasure in Kant For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for dutys sake, and not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would result).There are some philosophers (I will go into detail further on) who have claimed that Kants notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure that is, if you take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously present. However, I do not believe this is actually what Kant meant, and in this chapter I will explain why I believe this and attempt to elucidate exactly what Kant meant when he talked about duty, and the implications this has for our conception of pleasure. For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is done from duty, for dutys sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can claim under Kants theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly how we are meant to do our duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative, ‘he offers three different formulas of that law (Sullivan 1989: 149) so sometimes in philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself. Kant states that ‘there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative (Kant 1987: 4:421), but what is it, and how does he come to this conclusion? As I mentioned before, any categorical imperative must be synthetic because defining our morality depends on being able to formulate a synthetic a priori principle. A synthetic principle adds something new to our knowledge, and if it is also a priori, it means that this new knowledge does not depend on experience we are able to deduce this synthetic principle independently of any particular experience; we are able to deduce it by examining what we already know to be true about the world. This is because, for Kant, moral judgements are based on how the world ought to be, not how it is, so we cannot depend on our experiences of the world as it is to show us how the world should instead be. Morality cannot be based on experience, because we need an ethical theory that is capable of telling us what we should do, even in entirely n ew circumstances. The categorical imperative is essentially a law, because while everything in the world is subject to the laws of nature, only rational beings possess autonomy, possess a â€Å"(free) will†, so are capable of choosing to act according to any given law. ‘The idea of an objective principle in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command of reason, and the formula of the command is called an imperative. (Russell 2007: 644) Therefore, a theory of practical morality would be a theory of commands about how to act according to certain laws. A theory of morality would be a theory consisting of imperatives. Kant refers to his categorical imperative as the only one, because ‘logically there can be only one ultimate moral law [although] each of the three formulas emphasizes a different aspect of the same moral law (Sullivan 1989: 49). The aim of the Groundwork is to prove that such a principle (what Kant calls the categorical imperative) does exist. Such a principle would be the supreme principle of morality (Kant 1997: 4:392), in other words, the categorical imperative is synonymous with morality. Kant describes the categorical imperative, through three different formulas. The first is the formula of the universal law ‘act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (Kant 1997: 4:421). This law is Kants ‘single categorical imperative (Kant 1997: 4:421); however this is not exactly what our duty is, since the ‘universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). This means that in order for something to be our duty, it must be determined in accordance with universal laws, because duty is not subjective to each individual, but is something that is the same fo r all rational beings, in so far as we are rational. This means that our duty can and should be phrased as: ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). Kant uses four examples Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Introduction ‘Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. (Aristotle: 1094a1-3). Philosophy has always been concerned with trying to determine why we do the actions we do: what are we hoping to achieve by performing certain actions? The above quote is Aristotles opening sentence in the Nicomachean ethics, but how are we actually meant to achieve this good that we are aiming for? Many people in the world would be happy to support the claim that the good is achieved by being virtuous but what exactly does this entail? For Aristotle, ‘moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (Aristotle: 1103a16-17) and ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2). It then seems we are safe to claim that the good, (â€Å"moral excellence†), corresponds with happiness, but was he right? And does this happiness include pleasure, or is it excluded? Are virtue and pleasure synonymous? Can they even exist harmoniously at all? Throughout the history of thought, philosophers have attempted to discern that element of human nature that can be most aptly described as the action of taking pleasure in doing certain actions, and in the consequences that arise from any given action. The role of virtue in this pleasure process has been assessed and criticised for hundreds of years; does being virtuous give us pleasure, or does pleasure distract us from doing virtuous things? Is happiness the key to a moral life? My aim in this essay is to address these questions, and related questions, according to the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. In doing so, I aim to discover what the relation between virtue and pleasure really is, according to these two philosophers. My aim is to discover what the role is of both virtue and pleasure, and the connection between them, in the works of both philosophers, and try to establish where the two philosophies align, and where they are incompatible. At first, it seems as though both philosophers are wholly incompatible in their views of where our morality, our motivation to strive for the good, comes from. Even how the two define what the good is seems to differ too much to offer any similarities. As I briefly mentioned in my opening paragraph, for Aristotle, the purpose of human life is the good, and ‘the highest of all goods achievable by action is happiness. And [many] identify living well and faring well with being happy (Aristotle: 1095a16-19). For Kant however, the question of morality is wrapped up in the concept of â€Å"duty† ‘he does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth (Kant 1997: 4:398). In this essay I will explain exactly what both meant, and critically assess their ideas, with the ultimate goal of somehow reconciling the two seemingly opposing viewpoints. In the process of doing this I will first give an explanation of the foundations of these views what part of each philosophers lifes work these ideas about morality have arisen from. Background When examining any philosophical theory I think it is of vital importance to understand how those particular ideas have been formed what part of the writers thought and theories have these ideas originated from? In this section, I will give a brief overview of whereabouts in their respective works do Kant and Aristotle expound their views on morality, in reference to both pleasure and virtue. Aristotles Nicomachean ethics is part of his practical philosophy (along with his Eudemian ethics), and is primarily a search for what the ultimate goal of human life is. Aristotle was a student of Plato, and as such was likely to have been influenced by his philosophy. It is nothing new to philosophy to be preoccupied with morality. Arguably Platos greatest work, The Republic is fundamentally an inquiry into morality and justice, and what sort of society would be best for cultivating â€Å"the moral man†. In book II of The Republic, Plato tells a story of the mythical ring of Gyges, which is a ring that renders the wearer invisible. Glaucon (the teller of this story in the dialogue) claims that no man, no matter how virtuous or just he is, could resist acting immorally if there was no danger of punishment (Plato: 359c-360c). Glaucon does not believe that any man who had no consequences to face would be moral his claim is that we are moral because society forces us to be so, through fear of being reprimanded. In this case, morality becomes a social construct, and has nothing to do with the singular man who would dismiss moral behaviour in an instant if he believed he could avoid castigation. Aristotles ethics do not follow this way of reasoning, he believes that man can be moral within himself, and also that a man is not virtuous simply by performing virtuous actions, ‘his action must [also] proceed from a firm and unchangeable character (Aristotle: 1105a32-33). Aristotle is often misquoted about what he really meant, due to a mistranslation of the original Greek. Aristotle describes the goal of human life as eudaimonia, which is oft translated as happiness. However, the original meaning of this word is something more akin to being ‘blessed as regards ones own spirit (Pakaluk 2005: 47), or more literally, human flourishing. Pakaluk (2005) goes on to explain the fundamental differences between our commonplace definition of happiness and how we must understand it as a translation of eudaimonia. Most importantly we must understand that Aristotles happiness is not a hedonistic happiness where ‘pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of act ion (OED 1989). Eudaimonia is a stable, lasting condition, one that does not fluctuate according to day-to-day events it is an ultimate goal rather than a temporary one. It is also objectively universal it is not a subjective condition based upon the wants of each individual it is a state of being, not a mood or inclination, which is similar for all human beings and is characterised as living well ‘the happy man lives well and fares well (Aristotle: 1098b20). Aristotles definition of virtue is also similarly misunderstood. The original Greek is arete which means ‘any sort of excellence or distinctive power (Pakaluk 2005: 5). Thus being a virtuous person means possessing a certain sort of excellence (of character) which leads us to act virtuously. This form of morality bases the value of any action on the character of the agent an agent must be ‘a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or non-actions (Pojman 2002: 160). We cannot take morality from the actions in themselves, because virtue can be demonstrated through the conscious omission of any certain action morality must instead be based upon the agent. For Kant, his views of how pleasure can affect the goodness, or virtue, of any action can be found most clearly in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The Groundwork (1786) comes between the two different versions of the Critique of Pure Reason that were published (1781 and 1787), and there is certainly a crossover of concepts, with Kant utilising some of the arguments of the Critique in the Groundwork. Namely, his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, respectively, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. This distinction between the true essence of things, and their appearances provides us with ‘two standpoints from which [man] can regard himself and cognize laws for all of his actions (Kant 1987: 4:452). The aim of the Groundwork is to ‘proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle (Kant 1997: 4:392). In other words, Kant wants to start from the common perception that every action has some sort of moral value and discover what the underlying principle of morality is, that causes this presupposition. This supreme principle that we uncover must be a synthetic a priori one we must be able to deduce it from what we already know, because we are trying to discern how we ought to be from the evidence of how we are. The Groundwork is the quest to discover what this principle is. According to Kant a virtuous person is someone who performs the right actions for the right reasons (which seems to be similar with Aristotles view the action itself does not hold any value the value instead lies within the agents intent). A person who acts thus demonstrates a good will, which is the only thing to which we attribute total merit ‘It is impossible to think of anything that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Kant 1997: 4:393). This good will possesses worth completely independently of any circumstances, both the means and the ends are good. ‘Even if this will should yet achieve nothing, then [it is still] something that has it full worth in itself In other words, the good will does not need to achieve its end in order to be good, merely the attempt is so. Kant then introduces the concept of duty in order to explain how we are able to manifest the good will in our actions. The concept of duty ‘contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making in unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly (Kant 1997: 4:397). If we do our duty from duty (i.e. for its own sake, because it is the right thing to do, rather than due to some other inclination or motivating desire) then we are doing the right actions for the right reasons we are being virtuous. Kant uses formulations of his categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how we can determine what our duty is, although I will not go into them in this chapter. Kant shows that any system used to deduce our duty must be categorical, and not hypothetical, because a hypothetical imperative tells you how to achieve a certain end if you will x, then you must also will y in order to be able to achieve x. A hypothetical imperative is conditional, it depends on something else. A categorical imperative cannot be so it tells us what we ought to do unconditionally, not on the condition of something else. Kant uses his formulations of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate when we can say an act is done from duty or not. If an act is done from duty for dutys sake, then it is a virtuous action, if not, then it is not, even if the action is not necessarily â€Å"bad†. Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle Virtue can be taken to have several different meanings; the dictionary definition is ‘conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice (OED 1989). For Aristotle the idea of virtue is the mean between two vices, stray but a little from the middle, and you are no longer being wholly virtuous. This Aristotelian view of virtue is often seen as in direct opposition to the Kantian view of virtue that the virtuous man is the man who acts solely from the motivation of wanting to do his duty, without enjoying the act at all. I will explain in full whether this common view of Kantian ethics is correct in the following chapter, and in this chapter I will explain what I mean by my definition of Aristotelian virtue, and exactly what that signifies in relation to pleasure. Aristotles ethics are usually defined as virtue ethics they are agent centred, and depend (like Kant) not on the act that is done, but instead on what sort of person we need to be, what sort of character we need to have, in order to be able to commit virtuous acts. Aristotle starts off the Nicomachean ethics by trying to discern what the goal of human life is, and in book one manages to come up with what standards he thinks this goal must adhere to what are the characteristics this ultimate goal must have in order to be classed as such? Aristotle states that ‘we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be: for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else (Aristotle: 1097a34-1097b1). Our ultimate goal, the highest good, must be desired for itself only, and not as a means to something else. Aristotle refers to this ultimate goal of human life as eudaimonia, but what does this really mean? Does eudaimonia equate to hedonistic pleasure? Accordingly to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not synonymous with pleasure, he states that ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2), so happiness is the achievement of pure excellence, or of complete virtuousness. Human flourishing is what we achieve when we successfully fulfil the human function when we excel at what it is that makes us distinctly human. This means, that in order to understand this ‘human flourishing which is the ultimate goal of human life, we also need to understand the function of human beings ‘Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. (Aristotle: 1097b22-25). Aristotle believed that everything in the world has an â€Å"ergon†, a function, which is ‘that for the sake of which it exists; therefore the achieving of this work, or, more precisely, its doing so well, is its good; but only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well (Pakaluk 2005: 75). For example, the function of a knife is to cut things, so a good knife must be able to cut things well, therefore a good knife must be sharp. If there is to be a human function, then it will be what makes us essentially human what it is that separates us from everything el se in the world the thing that we are best capable of. But what makes Aristotle believe that humans necessarily have to have a function? Aristotle claims that it is merely common sense that man should have a function, because everything else in the world does ‘Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? Is he naturally functionless? (Aristotle: 1097b29-30). It seems clear that man must have a function just as any other thing does. So what is this function? If something only achieves its function well if it possesses the certain virtues that make it a good thing of its kind (like sharpness for the knife) then the human function must be something that is best achieved by humans more than anything else in the world. Or even, it may be something that is only achievable by human beings. ‘A virtue is a trait that makes a thing of a certain kind good and in view of which we call a thing of that kind â€Å"good†. (Pakaluk 2005: 75). In this way, Aristotles function argument follows on to an investigation into what qualities human beings possess, what virtues they possess in their character, that makes them distinctively human. In order to find out what the human function is, we need to find something that is distinctive to humans. It cannot be merely living, as that is shared with even plants, and it cannot be perception, because although that rules out plants, it still includes the animal kingdom. Instead the human function must be ‘an active life of the element that has a rational principle (Aristotle: 1098a3-4). In other words the human function, that element of human beings which is characteristic to us alone, is our capability to reason; our rationality. Of course, this definition of the human function as rationality causes some problems in the case of people who have diminished rationality what does this mean for them? Take, for example, the mentally handicapped who have reduced capacities of reason through no fault of their own are they really less capable of living fulfilling and flourishing lives than â€Å"normal† people? Are they â€Å"less good†? It seems as though, according to this argument, we are required to count them as worth less. However, I will not dwell on this problem, as I am more concerned with what this idea of a function implies for the role of pleasure in Aristotles ethics. What then, does it mean that the human function is our capacity to reason? The human function is what we must achieve excellence in, in order to be â€Å"good† (just as the knife must achieve excellence in its function of sharpness, in order to be a good knife). This means that morality, and consequently virtue, are intrinsically linked to the human function, to our rationality it is our reason that allows us to achieve virtue. We must use our reason in order to discern what is virtuous. Our function of rationality is what allows us to achieve our excellence, to achieve our virtue. So how does our reason allow us to achieve our virtue? It allows us to choose whatever course of action we feel would allow us best to achieve our happiness, our telos (ultimate goal). Hursthouse (1991) reads Aristotle as meaning that an action is regarded as â€Å"right† because it is what a virtuous person would choose to do, but is it not the other way round? Does a virtuous person not choose to do certain acts because they are good? This problem is obviously reminiscent of Euthyphros dilemma from the platonic dialogue of the same name is a certain act considered good because God says it is so, or does God say it is so because it is good. For Aristotle the ability to choose the morally right action in any situation is an ability to follow the moral mean ‘that moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense is it so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency (Aristotle: 1109a1-3). So for example, the virtue of bravery is the mean between cowardice and rashness. Aristotle also states that virtue is dependent on our character if we have the right character we will be predisposed to commit actions of the right sort. ‘Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind (Aristotle: 1103b20-22). Therefore, if we habitually perform the right sort of action, then we will generate the right sort of character, thus enabling us to almost automatically choose the correct action, which sits in the middle of this scale between virtue and vice. Our eudaimonia is more and m ore fulfilled by each instance in which our character â€Å"automatically† chooses the virtuous action. Does this idea of virtue as the mean between two vices imply that pleasure is then a vice, being the vice at one end of the scale of the virtue of moderation, whilst the other end is despair? A virtue can be best described as the course of action that allows us to achieve our eudaimonia. So is pleasure more suited to this task than despair (if we take despair to be the other end of the scale)? Would the mean on the scale in actuality lie closer to the end of pleasure than the other? Is this a purely arithmetical mean, the exact midpoint between two extremes, or is it something more flexible? Just as everyone requires different amounts of food in their everyday life (such that everyones â€Å"mean† between scarcity and gluttony differs), would it not make sense that the mean of enjoyment is different for everyone as well? Such that enjoyment of life, whilst it does not mean a slavish commitment to complete hedonistic pleasure, could mean that pleasure does play an important rol e in our lives. I believe that Aristotle would agree with me here, since he states that ‘no one nature or state is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the same pleasure (Aristotle: 1153b29-30). In other words, we do not all desire the same pleasures to the same degree, instead we pursue only those pleasures which are best suited to helping each of us, as an individual, to achieve our eudaimonia. We can therefore agree with Shermans reading of Aristotle, that ‘moral habituation is the cultivation of fine (or noble) pleasures and pains (Sherman 1989: 190). In this way, virtuousness does not mean a complete abandonment of all pleasure, but instead tells us that we should be interested in only those pleasures which are â€Å"worthy† of the rational mind. In some ways this bears similarity with Mills recalculation of Benthams utilitarianism that some pleasures (of the intellect) are worth more in the hedonic calculus than mere physical pleasures (Mill 2001). However, appreciation of the right pleasures is a taught skill also. By that I mean one of habit, such as virtue is according to Aristotle, and as such ‘we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained in the things that we ought (Aristotle: 1104b11-13). What is slightly problematic is that Aristotle gives two seemingly wholly different accounts of what pleasure is. In Book II he states that ‘it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things (Aristotle: 1104b10), by this meaning that a love of pleasure for itself will lead us to ignore the virtuous path and live a life of pure hedonism, thus failing to achieve our telos of eudaimonia. In Book VII he states that ‘the view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket (Aristotle: 1153a17-18). This view is nonsensical, and would lead us to having to avoiding almost every type of activity. Some pleasures are bad, but this does not necessarily make all pleasures bad. However, whilst these two accounts do differ, there is a common theme between them, which is that pleasure is not necessarily bad, and can exist in harmony with virtue. However, we need to qualify exactly what pleasures we mean here, as not all pleasure can be called good. Annas (1980) interprets Aristotle as believing that pleasure is only good when done by the virtuousness man, because the habit of his character will lead him to only choose to act on those pleasures which are virtuous ‘it is right for the good man to seek pleasure; pleasure will point him in the right direction. (Annas 1980: 286). Whereas the man who is immoral in habit will only persue those pleasures which ‘confirm the deplorable tendencies of [him], since it will strengthen his habits of wickedness and weakness (Annas 1980: 286-7). Here, the important point is not that we need to avoid pleasure, but that we need to be sure that we are pursuing the right kind of pleasure before we act upon it the pl easure of the virtuous man, not the deplorable man. The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Annas at first glance seems to be claiming that only a good person can access pleasure in a good way. Where does this leave the immoral man who wishes to reform his character? Is there no possibility that he will be able to choose those pleasures that are good for his character? Is this what Aristotle is really saying when he claims that virtue is a matter of habit, of character? ‘If the things [the good man] finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition. (Aristotle: 1176a19-22). This quote for one certainly seems to be suggesting that the virtuous man will be able to steer clear of immoral pleasures, whilst the immoral man will not. Aristotle emphasizes several times the fact that his ethics is based upon repeated behaviour, on habit, and ‘a short time [or virtuousness], does not make a man blessed or happy (Aristotle: 1098a18-19). What this means is that a period of immorality in a mans life does not necessarily preclude him from ever achieving his eudaimonia, and similarly, a brief period of virtuousness does not make a man wholly virtuous. Aristotles ethics is a system of right and wrong that demonstrates itself through habit, and habits can change, although it may be hard to dispose of bad habits, of immoral habits, because ‘it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion [for immoral pleasures] (Aristotle:1105a2-3). This does not mean that it is impossible, indeed it must be possible to change our character, otherwise what we are taught in our youth would be how we remain for life, meaning that whether we become a good or a bad person depends mor e on our teachers, rather than any attempt at morality by ourselves. We cannot be deprived of a chance at our eudaimonia just because we fail to receive the right training of character in our youth. It must be possible to reform and for the immoral man to pursue good pleasure or how else can he become a man who chooses only good pleasures out of habit? Some might claim that this seems unfair. If moral virtue is merely an act brought about by habit, then it is far easier for the good man to be virtuous that it is for the bad man to be so so where is the incentive for the bad man to change his ways and attempt to cultivate the right sort of character in order to be good by habit? But ‘even the good is better when it is harder (Aristotle: 1105a10), and the bad man will be rewarded if he perseveres. If a bad man successfully changes his character to that of the virtuous man, then he is satisfying the human function, the human ergon, and he will be able to achieve the ultimate telos for human beings eudaimonia his human flourishing. The incentive for the bad man to change his ways, no matter how difficult it may be, is that he will achieve the ultimate goal of complete happiness. In this way does the right sort of pleasure, lead first to the cultivation of a habit of character of complete excellence or virtue, which in turn then leads to ultimate happiness. However, as Hutchinson (1986) points out, there is a problem with this idea that, ultimately, restraint over which pleasures we decide to pursue is how we describe virtue. If ‘discipline produces virtue and, when misguided, defect of character, by means of pleasure and pain, the virtues (and vices) are dispositions for enjoying and disliking things (Hutchinson 1986: 79). Hutchinson goes on to state that this cannot be so, because children are rewarded in the study of arithmetic through pleasure and pain. So then ‘arithmetical skill is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain mathematical operations. And that is not true; it is simply a disposition to come to the right answer (Hutchinson 1986: 79). For Hutchinson Aristotles argument is unsuccessful merely because it is too vague, a vagueness which allows for the arithmetical comparison to be made, and this would not be a fault suffered if the argument was constructed with more care. Ultimately, this means that although th e argument is open to criticism, it leaves Aristotle quite confident in his claim that virtue is a form of character, created by the repeated habit of choosing the correct moral path that of the virtue at the mean point between two vices. And it is this mean point which will ultimately lead to eudaimonia. As long as pleasure is taken in moderation, it can still be synonymous with virtue, and allows for pleasure to be a part of our eudaimonia, the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Virtue and Pleasure in Kant For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for dutys sake, and not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would result).There are some philosophers (I will go into detail further on) who have claimed that Kants notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure that is, if you take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously present. However, I do not believe this is actually what Kant meant, and in this chapter I will explain why I believe this and attempt to elucidate exactly what Kant meant when he talked about duty, and the implications this has for our conception of pleasure. For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is done from duty, for dutys sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can claim under Kants theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly how we are meant to do our duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative, ‘he offers three different formulas of that law (Sullivan 1989: 149) so sometimes in philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself. Kant states that ‘there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative (Kant 1987: 4:421), but what is it, and how does he come to this conclusion? As I mentioned before, any categorical imperative must be synthetic because defining our morality depends on being able to formulate a synthetic a priori principle. A synthetic principle adds something new to our knowledge, and if it is also a priori, it means that this new knowledge does not depend on experience we are able to deduce this synthetic principle independently of any particular experience; we are able to deduce it by examining what we already know to be true about the world. This is because, for Kant, moral judgements are based on how the world ought to be, not how it is, so we cannot depend on our experiences of the world as it is to show us how the world should instead be. Morality cannot be based on experience, because we need an ethical theory that is capable of telling us what we should do, even in entirely n ew circumstances. The categorical imperative is essentially a law, because while everything in the world is subject to the laws of nature, only rational beings possess autonomy, possess a â€Å"(free) will†, so are capable of choosing to act according to any given law. ‘The idea of an objective principle in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command of reason, and the formula of the command is called an imperative. (Russell 2007: 644) Therefore, a theory of practical morality would be a theory of commands about how to act according to certain laws. A theory of morality would be a theory consisting of imperatives. Kant refers to his categorical imperative as the only one, because ‘logically there can be only one ultimate moral law [although] each of the three formulas emphasizes a different aspect of the same moral law (Sullivan 1989: 49). The aim of the Groundwork is to prove that such a principle (what Kant calls the categorical imperative) does exist. Such a principle would be the supreme principle of morality (Kant 1997: 4:392), in other words, the categorical imperative is synonymous with morality. Kant describes the categorical imperative, through three different formulas. The first is the formula of the universal law ‘act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (Kant 1997: 4:421). This law is Kants ‘single categorical imperative (Kant 1997: 4:421); however this is not exactly what our duty is, since the ‘universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). This means that in order for something to be our duty, it must be determined in accordance with universal laws, because duty is not subjective to each individual, but is something that is the same fo r all rational beings, in so far as we are rational. This means that our duty can and should be phrased as: ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). Kant uses four examples